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1Introduction
Amid the worst economic contraction since 1981-82, and possibly the Great 
Depression, attention has naturally turned toward the silver lining we might be 
able to find around the gloom. Some have turned toward historical work on the 
Great Depression, noting the bright spots that existed; others have examined the 
relationship, if any, between recessions and entrepreneurial activity.1 By peering 
into the economic past, we hope to somehow circumvent our very limited 
prognosticative abilities and answer the question, “What effect do recessions 
have on new firm formation?”
This research study, analyzing data from the U.S. Census, the Fortune 500, and 
the Inc. list of America’s fastest-growing companies, presents three main 
findings: 
1. Recessions and bear markets, while they bring pain and often lead to 
short-term declines in business formation, do not appear to have a 
significantly negative impact on the formation and survival of new 
businesses. 
2. Well-over half of the companies on the 2009 Fortune 500 list, and just 
under half of the 2008 Inc. list, began during a recession or bear market. 
We also find that the general pattern of founding years and decades can 
help tell a story about larger economic trends. 
3. Job creation from startups is much less volatile and sensitive to downturns 
than job creation in the entire economy.
While these data are far from conclusive and can only hint at broader trends, 
they do illustrate a more fundamental economic reality: each year, new firms 
steadily recreate the economy, generating jobs and innovations. These 
companies may be invisible, or they may one day grow into household names. 
But they constantly come into being as individuals bring forth their economic 
futures.
The Entrepreneurial Response to Recessions 
It might be expected that economic contractions would suppress, at least in the 
immediate run, the number of new companies founded each year. If we look at 
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1 Recent discussions have recalled Alexander Field’s American Economic Review article from six 
years ago calling the 1930s the most “technologically progressive” decade of the twentieth 
century: http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2009/03/the-most-technologically-
advanced-decade-of-the-20th-century.html. See also Alexander J. Field, “The Most 
Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” 93 American Economic Review 1399 (Nov. 
2003).
1 e.g., Paul Kedrosky, “Entrepreneurs and Recessions: Do Downturns Matter?” Kauffman 
Foundation Research Report, December 2008, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/
entrepreneurs_and_recessions_121508.pdf. For a look at a handful of successful companies 
begun during recessions, see http://www.inc.com/magazine/20080501/defying-
gravity_pagen_2.html.
2data on new firms and new establishments over time,3 including recessions, we 
see that this is indeed the case:
Figure 1
New Establishments and New Firms in Recessions (shaded areas)
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Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Business, http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susbdyn.htm; 
U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds.
New firm formation fell during the 1990-91 recession and from 2001-02 as well, 
but exceeded pre-recession levels within a couple of years. While the recessions 
of 1980, 1981-82, and 1990-91 led to dips in the number of new establishments, 
the numbers not only rebounded within a year or two, but the 2001 recession 
actually saw an increase in the number of new establishments. Downturns are 
not the only suppressive force: firm and establishment births also declined in the 
late 1990s, a period of expanding productivity, wages, and growth. (See the 
appendix for comparisons with productivity.) Comparing new establishments and 
bear markets, as well as the establishment entry rate against recessions, sheds 
no additional light (see appendix).
It is difficult to draw from these numbers alone sound conclusions concerning 
whether or not contractions matter to entrepreneurs. On the one hand, we might 
expect recessions or bear markets to suppress entrepreneurial activity: external 
financing (to the extent that new firms access it) might not be readily available. 
People might be less willing to leave a secure job; in general, the economy’s 
“animal spirits” might be dampened all around. 
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3 An “establishment” is a new location for an existing firm. Walmart, for example, is a single firm 
with several thousand establishments.
3On the other hand, there are good reasons to expect recessions and bear 
markets to be fertile periods for new firms and, possibly, their subsequent 
success. Although many new firms don’t rely on external financing in their early 
stages,4 a suppressed financial climate may be less immediately relevant to a 
person’s propensity to found a new company versus the person’s later ability to 
grow the company. Rising unemployment, because it is often concentrated 
among large or established companies, can free up pools of human capital in two 
ways. An unemployed individual, with some measure of experience (and, in 
some cases, a vested pension), may perceive a competitive opportunity to start a 
new company, and feel there’s nothing to lose.5 Entrepreneurs may also target 
the unemployed as a potential pool of employees. The matter of longer-term 
success is a bit murkier—although there is some evidence that recession-era 
companies may end up slightly more successful,6 it remains an open question. 
Using Our Economic Past to Explore Our Future
To get a better handle on these questions, and to begin to explore, as far as 
possible, the implications of the 2007-09 recession and bear market, we looked 
at two existing data sources, the Fortune and Inc. magazine lists of, respectively, 
the largest American companies and the fastest-growing companies. These 
permit the examination of relatively sizeable datasets across time, as well as the 
experiences of specific companies.
We began by assembling the founding dates of the companies on the 2009 
Fortune list. In most cases, this is rather straightforward: a company began in a 
particular year. In some cases, however, the question of a firm’s founding date is 
much more ambiguous because of mergers, direct or indirect ancestry, whether 
to date a founding from a first patent or incorporation, etc. For these questions, 
we used two sources. One was a previous analysis of Fortune 500 founding 
dates conducted in 19967; the other was consultation of a company’s own Web 
site. When multiple founding dates appeared (across Fortune or financial 
information sites), we used the company’s indication of the date to which it traces 
its history.8
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4 e.g. Alicia Robb, et al, “An Overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey: Results from the 2004-2007 Data,” 
Kauffman Foundation, April 2009, http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/kfs_fourth_040709.pdf. 
5 A boost may also come in the form of “necessity” entrepreneurship—a displaced worker opens 
his/her own business because it is his/her only option.
6 Kedrosky, supra note 2. 
7 Harris Corporation, “Founding Dates of the 1994 Fortune 500 U.S. Companies,” Business 
History Review, Spring 1996, 69.
8 Due to irreconcilable findings or inability to verify a date, twelve companies from the Fortune 
500 were excluded from final findings. The final sample, then, is 488.
4Figure 2
2009 Fortune 500, Founding Decades
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Source: Fortune 500, author’s calculations.
Once these dates were assembled, we compared them to the expansion and 
contraction dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), official 
keeper of business cycles for the U.S. economy.9 Bear market dates, covering 
the period 1929-present, were taken from two sources.10
The conclusions concerning the Fortune 500 are somewhat surprising, to say the 
least. Of the 488 companies included in the final analysis, 256 or 51 percent, 
began during a recession or bear market or both.11 This, however, is an 
understatement: NBER business cycle dating begins in December 1854, and a 
number of companies, forty to be exact, trace their beginnings to pre-1855 years. 
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9 NBER, Business Cycles and Expansions, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
10 A bear market is commonly defined as a period of time during which a stock index, such as the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average or Standard & Poor’s 500, falls 20 percent or more. For graphs on 
bear market reference dates used in this paper, see “How This Bear Market Compares,” New 
York Times, Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/10/11/business/
20081011_BEAR_MARKETS.html, and JP Koning, Financial Graphs and Art, 
http://www.financialgraphart.com/public.html.
11 Of these 256, fifty-three were founded during a bear market only, meaning that 45 percent of our 
Fortune 500 sample were founded during recessions. We recognize that relying on the Fortune 500 
list presents the issue of survivorship bias—one that potentially changes, moreover, from year to 
year. That is, looking only at the 500 largest companies in 2008 and their founding dates excludes 
all other firms that started in a given year, as well as the companies that were on the list in prior 
years but either fell off or disappeared altogether. A snapshot in 1978 or 1958 would obviously look 
different. For this reason, as will become clear, we tried to look as much as we could at new firm 
survival rates, and tried to be circumspect with our more general conclusions.
5Excluding these leaves a dataset of 448 Fortune 500 companies—of these, an 
extraordinary 57 percent were founded during a recession or bear market.12
What about the country’s fastest-growing firms? Every year, Inc. magazine 
publishes a list of the 500 (expanded in recent years to 5,000) fastest-growing 
companies. To get a different perspective on the distribution of founding dates, 
we consulted the Inc. 500 lists for 1985 and 2008.13 In 1985, for the 372 
companies that reported a founding date, 26 percent were founded during a 
recession, and 41 percent during a bear market. Thus, two-thirds of the 
companies began during a recession or bear market.14 In 2008, each of the top 
500 companies reported a founding date—only 17 percent were founded during 
a recession, while 31 percent began amid a bear market. This means nearly half 
of the 2008 Inc. originated in a recession or bear market.15
That well over half of the largest companies in the United States and close to half 
of the fastest-growing firms were founded during recessions or bear markets is, 
or should be seen as, remarkable. But does it tell us anything useful about our 
economic future beyond the current downturn? To address this, we calculated, 
again using the NBER business cycle dates, that from 1855 to 2002, the United 
States experienced a total of 544 months of contraction: 31 percent of the entire 
period. In other words, since 1855, we have been in periods of contraction 
roughly one-third of the time.
If we break this century and a half into segments, we see sometimes large 
differences. From 1855 to 1919, for example, the economy was in contraction just 
under half the time (45 percent); from 1919-1945, 33 percent. The postwar period 
has, by contrast, been dominated by expansion: the economy was contracting only 
15 percent of this time. By simple probability, then, a company founded in the 
nineteenth century had a higher chance of being founded during a recession than 
one founded since World War II. This, of course, assumes that all recessions are 
more or less the same, which is likely not to be a valid assumption. 
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12 Two of the pre-1855 companies were founded in 1837, a year that experienced a significant 
financial panic. These were excluded from our total number of recession and bear market 
foundings.
13 Inc., http://www.inc.com/inc5000/2008/the-full-list.html. 
14 Compared to the Fortune list, the companies ranked by Inc. present a much narrower band of 
ages. The mean age of the 372 companies in 1985 was just under nine years, with a median of 
seven. The average Inc. firm, then, would have been founded either in 1976 or 1978, both bear 
market years.
15 The mean age of the 2008 top 500 was 7 !, with a median of six, indicating that the average 
Inc. firm would have been founded in 2001, a recession year, or 2002, a bear market year. This 
makes it somewhat remarkable, then, that only eighty-three of the 500 firms were founded during 
a recession, with 2001 being the most common recessionary year. Note that we don’t double 
count: a company founded in 2001 is counted as starting during a recession, notwithstanding that 
the bear market lasted from early 2000 into late 2002. Thus, we can combine the eighty-three 
firms founded during a recession with the 157 founded during a bear market to get the figure that 
48 percent of the list was founded during either a recession or bear market.
6To even this out, we combined postwar recessions and bear markets: how often 
has the United States experienced recessions and/or bear markets since 1945? 
The answer: 43 percent of the time, a figure much more comparable to earlier 
eras. This, of course, also assumes that bear markets are somewhat equivalent 
in their economic effect to recessions, an assumption that may be less than 
sound. Furthermore, no company can have fully anticipated success, let alone 
known that it would later appear on the Fortune 500 list (which was only 
established in 1955 anyway). And, even when a firm began during a recession, 
there was probably uncertainty (with some exceptions), as to whether the 
country was in fact officially experiencing a contraction or whether, on the back 
end, it had emerged from an official contraction. Today, with all our 
sophisticated economic modeling tools, the recession that began in December 
2007 was not officially called until a year after it had begun (although, to be fair, 
many publications, including Inc., had already concluded that the United States 
was in recession).
Nonetheless, the general analysis holds: over half of our largest companies 
began during a recession or bear market. The next step in the analysis is a bit 
more tenuous: surveying the years and decades during which today’s Fortune 
500 companies were founded, can we infer backward anything about those 
periods? That is, seeing that the first decade of the twentieth century boasts the 
most subsequent Fortune firms (54), does that allow us to say anything relative 
to other decades? Are there trends we can validly identify?
The prima facie fact that 1900-09 and the 1920s turn out to be two of the most 
common decades for future Fortune firms shouldn’t be too surprising. Many of 
the industries that came to dominate the twentieth century, and (evidently) still 
play a large role today, emerged in that era. The late Joseph Schumpeter, the 
leading economist of entrepreneurship, based much of his economic and 
historical analysis on the first great period of entrepreneurial capitalism, the half-
century from roughly 1880 up to the Great Depression, commonly referred to as 
the Second Industrial Revolution. Thus, companies like Sears (1886), General 
Electric (1892), 3M (1902), Ford (1903), Boeing (1916), State Farm Insurance 
(1922), and Delta Air Lines (1924) date from this era. 
That years generally remembered as highly entrepreneurial and revolutionary 
should coincide with the founding dates of a number of still-successful 
companies is none too surprising. That this fifty-year period experienced 
contractions 41.5 percent of the time (including three rather severe downturns: 
1893-94, 1896-97, 1920-21), is perhaps a bit surprising. 
Looking at Figure 2, we can see that from the 1920s, there is a steady drop to 
the 1930s (predictably, perhaps), to the 1940s (again, predictably), and to the 
1950s. This is followed by a spike in the 1960s, continued through the 1970s and 
into the 1980s. Do these ups and downs allow us to generalize about the 
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7economy? Seeing that the 1930s display a drop compared to the previous few 
decades is, as indicated, to be expected. The Great Depression, lasting from late 
1929 to early 1933, with lingering effects after that, followed by a recession in 
1937-38, wouldn’t indicate a particularly propitious time to start a company. Yet 
the decade turns out to be home to an above-average number of Fortune 500 
companies (29; the average for all decades is 22), and if we look at the decade, 
we see that the recessionary years were stronger than the recovery years.
Figure 3
Fortune 500 Foundings in the 1930s
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Source: Fortune 500, author's calculations
When compared, moreover, to subsequent decades, the 1930s stand out. We 
shouldn’t be shocked to learn that the 1940s were an average decade (so much 
production during the first half of the decade was directed toward the war), but 
the 1950s jump out to any casual observer. Could it be that what is often 
perceived to be the high tide of bureaucratic capitalism—in which the 
entrepreneurial companies of the 1890s, 1900s, and 1920s grew to be industrial 
behemoths, supported by powerful labor unions and a government swollen by 
depression and war—actually did have a dampening effect on new firm 
formation? Historical statistics certainly suggest that, in the aggregate, firm 
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8formation in the 1950s lagged behind other decades.16 On its face, then, the low 
number of the 1950s appears to support the conventional story of the 1950’s 
“organization man.” There is some evidence, too, that during the 1950s, the U.S. 
financial sector was underdeveloped relative to earlier and later decades, a state 
of affairs that would tend to favor established, rather than new, companies.17
One way to test the relationship between the firm formation climate in any given 
year and the number of Fortune 500 firms that emerged is to look at the years for 
which we do have such information. In Figure 1, we charted the number of new 
establishments from 1977 to 2005; we can now compare that line to the number 
of Fortune firms founded each year.
Figure 4
Fortune 500 Foundings and New Establishments
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16 In 1900, the number of firms per 1,000 in population stood at 15.4, rising to 18.2 in 1929 and, 
by 1950, held rather steady at 17.7. In ten years, however, the number fell to 14.99. George 
Thomas Kurian (ed.), Datapedia of the United States, 1790-2005: America Year by Year 7, 435 
(2nd ed., 2001). The number of new business started in the 1950s averaged 385,000 a year, 
compared to 441,000 a year from 1944 to 1949. There was a burst of new business formation, 
not surprisingly, in 1946, after years of war and depression—a 75 percent increase over 1944. No 
year in the 1950s approached the average number of new businesses started from 1944-1949 
and, if we’re tempted to read backward from the numbers, the late 1940s also produced more 
Fortune firms than the 1950s. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, http://www.census.gov/
prod/www/abs/statab1951-1994.htm. Despite these numbers, it is difficult to be conclusive about 
firm creation in these years.
17 e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century,” 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (2003).
9There doesn’t appear, at least according to this chart, to be any relationship at 
all, and when we plot the two datasets on a scatter plot, no correlation emerges. 
(A similar chart dating to 1960 appears in the appendix.) This could mean one of 
two things. First, there might simply be no relationship between the number of 
new establishments started in a year and their subsequent success rates, 
whether success is counted as survival past a certain age, employment and 
revenue growth, or, eventually, sufficient size to make the Fortune list. Or, we 
may be too close in time to tell any relationship between these numbers in the 
period since 1977; in that case, we could need more data down the road. 
Most likely, of course, we simply can’t tell one way or the other. In fact, if we look 
at five-year survival rates for any given year’s crop of new firms, a remarkably 
consistent pattern emerges.
Figure 5
Survival of New Firms
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This pattern is, initially, quite surprising. For each year, an average of 48-49 
percent of new firms survive to age five, and the line for each year is very similar: 
sharp drops in years one and two, with a flattening in years three to five.18 But 
this makes sense when we consider that there is remarkable consistency from 
year to year in the number of new firms and establishments that Americans start. 
It doesn’t appear, then, that we can tell much about a given year based on the 
number of new firms and their survival—Fortune 500 foundings are just as good 
an indicator.19 Yet it’s not entirely clear that we can really infer that a particular 
year was “good” or “bad” for firm formation based on how many Fortune 500 
companies it eventually produced. Was 1959, claiming four Fortune firms, better 
for new companies than 1923 (three), despite the vast differences between the 
decades? There is really no way, using these data or really any set of strictly 
quantitative data, that we can say.
That said, there is wide variability across different industries, different firms, and 
the quality of survival—simply surviving to age five may say nothing about the 
firm’s actual health. If we drilled down and pulled the numbers apart, we would 
likely find a high level of churn.20 Economist Arnold Harberger, in attempting to 
capture this paradox, has said that while we usually envision economic growth as 
akin to yeast, rising evenly, it much more resembles mushrooms—some firms 
and sectors racing ahead, others falling behind, with the actors and their roles 
changing each decade, if not each year.21
Canvassing the histories of Fortune 500 companies provides a similar lesson in 
messy capitalism: these firms, notwithstanding their size and perceived 
sluggishness, are not the Imperial Walkers of Star Wars. There is so much churn 
and turnover, combination and recombination occurring at any given time in the 
American economy, that it’s often difficult to trace the effects of recessions or bear 
markets on any one company. Within one company, moreover, there will often be 
multiple changes of business as management moves from opportunity to 
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18 These numbers are in line with other research. e.g., Amy E. Knaup & Merissa C. Piazza, 
“Business Employment Dynamics Data: Survival and Longevity,” II, Monthly Labor Review, 
September 2007, at 3; Brian Headd & Bruce Kirchhoff, “Small Business Growth: Searching for 
Stylized Facts,” U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy Working Paper, October 
2007.
19 The longer a firm survives, moreover, the higher its probability of subsequent survival. e.g., 
Amy E. Knaup & Merissa C. Piazza, “Business Employment Dynamics Data: Survival and 
Longevity,” II, Monthly Labor Review, September 2007, at 3. 
20 e.g., Amy E. Knaup, “Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data,” 
Monthly Labor Review, May 2005, at 50, 52 (“A closer look at the growth of the birth cohort 
reveals a wide variation in the growth of employment in each sector, in contrast to the fairly stable 
measures of establishment survival across sectors.”); Amy E. Knaup & Merissa C. Piazza, 
“Business Employment Dynamics Data: Survival and Longevity,” II, Monthly Labor Review, 
September 2007, at 3.
21 Arnold Harberger, “A Vision of the Growth Process,” 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (March 1998). 
11
opportunity. FirstEnergy, for example (#194 on the 2009 list), comprises seven 
different companies that eventually came together, the earliest dating to 1930. 
Another, MeadWestvaco (#365), identifies its first ancestor as starting up in 1846. 
Our largest companies are full of these types of stories and, perhaps paradoxically, 
reinforce the general nature of the American economy: messiness. To make an 
analogical stretch, the U.S. economy evolves much as an organism or ecosystem 
does—through the constant combination and recombination of new and existing 
ideas and companies, the sum of which generates economic growth and progress.
Given this narrative, and following from the observation that the 1950s appeared 
to mark the zenith of bureaucratic capitalism, what can we say about the 
decades closer to our own time? The spikes in the 1960s and 1980s run together 
with the story of the American economy’s entrepreneurial rebirth.22 Rather than 
dating this rebirth, as is usually done, to 1980, however, it appears that the wave 
of companies that have risen to dominance today began to pop up during the 
1960s, particularly the latter part of the decade.
Figure 6
Fortune 500 foundings, with Recessions and Bear Markets [combined] (shaded areas)
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Source: Fortune 500, author's calculations.
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22 e.g., Carl J. Schramm, The Entrepreneurial Imperative, (2006).
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Familiar names date from the late 1960s: Quest Diagnostics (1967); Intel (1968); 
and Advanced Micro Devices (1969). The 1970s saw the founding of, inter alia, 
Charles Schwab (1971); Microsoft (1975); Home Depot (1978); and Micron 
Technology (1978). The entrepreneurial wave continued into the 1980s and, as a 
result of the rise of new types of industries (Amgen, 1980; Dell, 1984; Cisco 
Systems, 1984; Staples, 1986), and the renewal of old ones (Valero Energy, 
1980; Verizon, 1983; Capital One, 1988; Express Scripts, 1986), forty-nine 
companies on the 2009 Fortune 500 list date to that decade.23
Looking at Figure 6, and recalling that over half of the entire list was founded 
during a recession and/or bear market, we might be tempted to again conjecture 
that business cycles don’t matter to entrepreneurs. Talk to an entrepreneur and 
you will quickly see that they often act on an urge or a hunch indifferent to the 
prevailing economic winds. Indeed, a downturn might actually act as an extra 
spur to founding a new company, if the founders perceive that their prospective 
competition might be weakened. And when we look at comparative job creation 
numbers, we can certainly see that startups demonstrate a much less variable 
response to business cycles than existing firms.
Figure 7 
Job Creation, Entire Economy and from Startups, Showing Recessions
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23 The late 1960s was also the time when intangible capital began to catch and, in the 1970s and 
1980s, pass tangible capital in terms of relative shares of the economy. Dominique Foray, The 
Economics of Knowledge, 22 (2004). 
13
Figure 8
Startups, and Economy sans Startups
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Trends in Today’s Economy
The most recent recession before the current downturn, that of 2001—and the 
accompanying bear market of 2000-02—illustrates some potentially interesting 
trends. As noted, the companies included on the Inc. 500 list are, on average, six 
to seven years old. This makes sense: young companies are simply more likely 
to grow at the astronomical rates (four-digit revenue growth for three years) 
necessary for inclusion on the list. Thus, most of the Inc. firms that were founded 
during a recession or bear market began in the 2000-02 period. Several of the 
foregoing charts, particularly Figures 2 and 8, as well as the charts in the 
appendix, seem to indicate that the recession and bear market earlier this 
decade didn’t have much of an impact on new business formation and related 
jobs creation—especially compared to prior recessions.24
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24 The birth rate of new firms also appears to be a reliable business cycle predictor, falling months 
before a recession sets in, and rising before it officially ends. e.g., Akbar Sadeghi, “The Births and 
Deaths of Business Establishments in the United States,” Monthly Labor Review, December 
2008, at 3. Sadeghi’s research also raises an important question as to the future of new firm 
creation. He shows that over the past few years, even as firm births have increased, there has 
been slowing employment creation from such births, due to the decreasing average size of new 
firms (and, evidently, rising productivity). While on one level this is not surprising (anecdotal 
evidence has pointed toward the lessening need for capital and employees in new firms, 
particularly in services), it may also suggest a Red Queen effect—we need more and more new 
firms to compensate for their shrinking employment size. Further research is required.
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It is tempting to read these signs as suggestions that new firm formation now 
represents the optimal countercyclical economic policy; as mentioned, there 
are certainly good reasons for individuals to start new companies during a 
downturn. The link, however, between new firms and aggregate economic 
performance is not so straightforward. For one thing, some evidence indicates 
that the jobs created by startups follow a U-shaped curve—generating jobs 
immediately in their first year, having a negative impact on jobs in years three 
to five, followed by a more durable positive impact on job creation.25 Even the 
companies on the Inc. 500 list must demonstrate sustained growth over several 
years. Furthermore, the median employment size of the 2008 Inc. firms is 48—
a handful are quite large and more will continue to grow larger, but most of 
them will remain small in terms of job creation. Since 2001, the average size of 
new firms has fallen by two employees, from six to four. These facts raise 
questions about the extent to which new companies created in 2008 and 2009 
will pull the U.S. economy out of recession. 
Yet, for a variety of reasons, such questions are a bit misleading. First, an 
individual or team of individuals doesn’t start a company as an explicit attempt to 
help the country combat recession. Their motivation is either a good idea or 
simply a way to beat unemployment—they founded their firm to start building 
their future. Because the patterns of job expansion and contraction in established 
companies often amount to a net gain of zero, many people see starting a 
company—especially amid a recession—as a way to take their future into their 
own hands. Their objective isn’t often scale growth (let alone the Fortune or Inc. 
lists). As we saw, it’s probably impossible to predict the caliber of a given year’s 
new firms. In times of recession, the important contribution of such new firms—
regardless of their eventual fate—comes in their immediate positive impact on 
job creation. As we well know today, job creation is economic policy’s top priority.
Second, the benefits of new firm formation are generally recognized to extend 
beyond job creation. New companies may come into existence to commercialize 
a new innovation, and they may be more productive than existing firms, thus 
driving economic growth. Startups may also remain small yet have a hugely 
positive impact on innovation and job creation in other companies and industries.
THE ECONOMIC FUTURE JUST HAPPENED
25 e.g., Michael Fritsch & Pamela Mueller, “Effects of New Business Formation on Regional 
Development over Time,” 38 Regional Studies 961 (Nov. 2004); C. Mirjam van Praag & Peter H. 
Versloot, “What is the Value of Entrepreneurship? A Review of Recent Research,” 29 Small Bus. 
Econ. 351 (Dec. 2007). 
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Third, the nature of the American economy may be changing such that new 
firms do play an increasingly important role in digging out of recessions. The 
overriding consideration here is that the U.S. economy is now dominated, not 
just by service-oriented businesses,26 but by highly innovative services 
reshaping the pattern of economic activity. An innovative service may, in many 
minds, conjure up images of high-technology companies, and the Inc. list does 
include a fair share of information technology and software firms. But there is 
also a seemingly infinite variety of ways to innovate even in well-established 
sectors like food and retail.
The great lesson of this analysis is not that we should take heart in the 
knowledge that the next generation of Fortune 500 firms are likely being born 
during this recession. As in most other years, 2008 and 2009 will each produce 
anywhere from 400,000 to 700,000 startups. Many will fail, some will limp along, 
and many will survive and thrive. A tiny number may turn out to be among the 
largest companies of 2020 or 2030. A few hundred will show up on the Inc. 500 
list in a few years (it is noteworthy that each of the last five recessions, dating to 
1973, has produced high-growth firms). 
But, despite the pain of the current recession, there is reason for hope—good 
things do grow out of recessions. More importantly, new firm formation 
represents two unqualifiedly positive things. Hundreds of thousands of individuals  
do not wait for others to ease their economic pain—they create jobs for 
themselves and others. Young firms, moreover, frequently add jobs and generate 
innovations well out of the mainstream. When a large, established company 
announces deep layoffs, it necessarily makes front-page news. When two or 
three dozen young firms hire four, six, or eight people at a time for several years, 
it mostly goes unnoticed. Only when they reach sufficient collective size do they 
begin to appear in the public consciousness, even though they have been 
regenerating the economy for several years. Every generation of startups is, 
often invisibly, both a renewal and restructuring of the economy.
THE ECONOMIC FUTURE JUST HAPPENED
26 Services, despite claims to the contrary, have always played a hugely important economic role 
in the United States.
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APPENDIX
Figure 9
New Establishments and Bear Markets (shaded areas)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, 
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds.
Figure 10
Establishment Entry Rate and Bear Markets (shaded areas)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, 
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds.
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Figure 11
Establishment Entry Rate and Recessions (shaded areas) 
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Figure 12
Business Formation and Fortune 500 Foundings (shaded areas)
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Figure 13
Firm Births and Productivity 
Births and Prod. Change
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http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susbdyn.htm; 
Council of Economic Advisers, 2009 Economic Report of the President, Table B-50, 
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Figure 14
New Establishments and Productivity
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Figure 15
New Establishments and Productivity
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http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html.
THE ECONOMIC FUTURE JUST HAPPENED
